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Abstract 
Fraud in corporations is a topic that receives significant and growing attention from regulators, auditors, and the 
public.  Increasingly external auditors are being asked to play an important role in helping organizations prevent 
and detect fraud.  Detecting fraud is not an easy task and requires thorough knowledge about the nature of fraud, 
how it can be committed and concealed.   This paper aims at broadening external auditors’ knowledge about 
fraud and why it occurs.  It explains Cressey’s fraud theory and shows its significance, presents the other fraud 
models and relates them to Cressey’s model, and proposes a new fraud triangle model that external auditors 
could consider when assessing the risk of fraud.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate fraud is a topic that has received 
significant and growing attention from regulators, 
auditors, and the public.   External auditors are 
increasingly being asked to play an important role in 
helping organizations prevent and detect fraud.  
Detecting fraud is not an easy task and requires 
thorough knowledge about the nature of fraud, why it 
is committed, and how it can be committed and 
concealed.  Cressey’s fraud theory explained why 
trust violators commit fraud and was widely used by 
regulators, professionals, and academics.  This work 
has been conceptualised as “the fraud triangle”.  
However, critics of the fraud triangle argued that it 
cannot help alone in explaining fraud because two 
factors cannot be observed (rationalisation and 
pressure), and other important factors, like 
capabilities of the fraudsters, are ignored. 
 
Hence, in the current paper, Cressey’s fraud theory is 
explained and its significance is highlighted.  The 
paper also assesses the fraud triangle in light of other 
fraud models, and proposes a new fraud triangle 
model that should be considered by external auditors 
in assessing fraud risk.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Why people commit fraud was first examined by 
Donald Cressey, a criminologist, in 1950.  His 
research was about what drives people to violate 
trust.  He interviewed 250 criminals  over a period of 
5 months whose behaviour met two criteria: (1) the 
person must have accepted a position of trust in good 
faith, and (2) he must have violated the trust.  He 
found that three factors must be present for a person 
to violate trust and was able to conclude that: 
“Trust violators when they conceive of themselves as 
having a financial problem which is non-shareable, 
have knowledge or awareness that this problem can 
be secretly resolved by violation of the position of 
financial trust, and are able to apply to their own 
conduct in that situation verbalisations which enable 
them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as 
trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves 
as users of the entrusted funds or property” (page 
742). The three factors were non-shareable financial 
problem, opportunity to commit the trust violation, 
and rationalisation by the trust violator.  When it 
comes to non-shareable financial problem, Cressey 
stated “[p]ersons become trust violators when they 
conceive of themselves as having incurred financial 
obligations which are considered as non-socially-
sanctionable and which, consequently, must be 
satisfied by a private or secret means” (page 741).  
 
He also mentioned that perceived opportunity arises 
when the fraudster sees a way to use their position of 
trust to solve the financial problem, knowing they are 
unlikely to be caught.  As for rationalisation, Cressey 
believed that most fraudsters are first-time offenders 
with no criminal record. They see themselves as 
ordinary, honest people who are caught in a bad 
situation.  This enables them justify the crime to 
themselves in a way that makes it acceptable or 
justifiable.  
 
Cressey found that: 
“In the interviews, many trust violators expressed the 
idea that they knew the behaviour to be illegal and 
wrong at all times and that they merely kidded 
themselves into thinking that it was not illegal” (page 
741).  
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   Over the years, Cressey’s hypothesis has become well 
known as “the fraud triangle” as shown in Figure 1 below.  
The first side of the fraud triangle represents a pressure or 
motive to commit the fraudulent act, the second side 
represents a perceived opportunity, and the third side 
stands for rationalisation (Wells 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Fraud Triangle 
Source: Wells, J. T., 2005. Principles of fraud 
examination. Hoboken, New York: John Wiley and 
Sons 
 
In 1953, Cressey published his research in a book called 
“Other People’s Money”.  He divided the non-sharable 
financial problems into six categories: difficulty in 
paying back debts, problems resulting from personal 
failure, business reversals (uncontrollable business 
failures such as inflation or recession), physical isolation 
(trust violator is isolated from people who can help him), 
status gaining (living beyond one’s means, and 
employer-employee relations (employer’s unfair 
treatment).  
 
Researchers in the audit literature defined differently 
the components of the fraud triangle and gave 
different examples for each.  For instance, Lister 
(2007, p.63) defined the pressure/motive to commit 
fraud as “the source of heat for the fire” but he 
believed the presence of these pressures in someone’s 
life does not mean he or she will commit fraud.  He 
also added there are three types of motivation or 
pressure: Personal pressure to pay for lifestyle, 
employment pressure from continuous compensation 
structures, or management’s financial interest, and 
external pressure such as threats to the business 
financial stability, financier covenants, and market 
expectations.   Lister saw opportunity, which is the 
second side of the fraud triangle, as “the fuel that 
keeps the fire going” and he believed even if a person 
has a motive, he or she cannot perpetrate a fraud 
without being given an opportunity.  He also gave 
some examples of opportunities that can lead to fraud 
like high turnover of management in key roles, lack 
of segregation of duties, and complex transactions or 
organizational structures. As for the third component 
of the fraud triangle, rationalization, Lister defined it 
as “the oxygen that keeps the fire burning”.  He 
mentioned that although auditors may not be able to 
assess the personal value systems of each individual 
in the organization, they can assess the corporate 
culture.  
 
On the other hand, Vona (2008) believed the motive 
to commit fraud is often associated with personal 
pressures or corporate pressures on the individual.  
The motive to commit fraud may be driven by the 
pressures influencing the individual, by 
rationalization, or by sheer opportunity. He believed 
a person’s position in the organisation contribute to 
the opportunity to commit fraud. He also believed 
there is a direct correlation between opportunity to 
commit fraud and the ability to conceal the fraud.  
Thus, understanding the opportunity for fraud to 
occur allows auditors to identify, which fraud 
schemes an individual can commit, and how fraud 
risks occur when the controls do not operate as 
intended by management. 
 
Albrecht et al. (2008, 2010), however, mentioned 
pressure/motive can be financial or non-financial and 
they gave examples of perceived financial pressures 
that can motivate fraud like; personal financial losses, 
falling sales, inability to compete with other 
companies, greed, living beyond one’s means, 
personal debt, poor credit, the need to meet short-
term credit crises, inability to meet financial 
forecasts, and unexpected financial needs.  They also 
gave examples of non-financial pressure, such as; the 
need to report results better than actual performance, 
frustration with work, or even a challenge to beat the 
system.  They believed that even with very strong 
perceived pressures, executives who believe they will 
be caught and punished rarely commit fraud.  They 
also mentioned some examples of rationalizations 
that executives can use to commit fraud, like; “we 
need to keep the stock price high”, all companies use 
aggressive accounting practices, or it is for the good 
of the company.  As for perceived opportunities to 
commit fraud examples include; a weak board of 
directors, a lack of or circumvention of controls that 
prevent/detect fraudulent behavior, failure to 
discipline fraud perpetrators, lack of access to 
information, and the lack of an audit trail.  
 
Murdock (2008) also argued that pressure can be a 
financial pressure, non financial, or political and 
social pressure.  Non-financial pressure can be 
derived from a lack of personal discipline or other 
weaknesses such as gambling habit, drug addiction.  
While, political and social pressure occurs when 
people feel they cannot appear to fail due to their 
status or reputation.  However, Rae and 
Subramaniam (2008), saw pressure relates to 
employees motivation to commit fraud as a result of 
greed or personal financial pressure, and opportunity 
refers to a weakness in the system where the 
employee has the power or ability to exploit, making 
fraud possible, while rationalisation as a justification 
of fraudulent behavior as a result of an employee’s 
lack of personal integrity, or other moral reasoning. 
 
It can be concluded from the above definitions of 
motives/pressures that motives were classified 
differently. Some researchers classified them as 
Pressure 
Opportunity Rationalization 
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personal, employment, or external pressure, while 
others classified them as financial and non-financial 
pressures. However, it can be noticed that both 
classifications are some-how related. For instance, 
personal pressure can come from both financial and 
non-financial pressure. A personal financial pressure 
in this case could be gambling addiction or a sudden 
financial need, while a personal non-financial 
pressure can be lack of personal discipline or greed. 
By the same token, employment pressure and 
external pressure can come from either financial or 
non-financial pressure. This link can be illustrated as 
shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Classifications of Pressure/Motive 
 
    Cressey’s fraud theory, normally known as the fraud 
triangle theory, was widely supported and used by audit 
professionals and standards’ setters as a tool for detecting 
fraud.  For instance, in 1987, the Commission of the 
Treadway Committee reviewed both alleged and proven 
instances of fraudulent financial reporting and issued a 
report that supports Cressey’s findings.  Results revealed 
that: 
“Fraudulent financial reporting usually occurs as the 
result of certain environmental, institutional, or 
individual forces and opportunities.  These forces and 
opportunities add pressures and incentives that 
encourage individuals and companies to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting and are present to some 
degree in all companies.  If the right, combustible 
mixture of forces and opportunities is present, 
financial reporting may occur” (1987, p.23). In 2002, 
SAS No. 99 supported the use of Cressey’s fraud 
triangle by mentioning that: 
 
 “Three conditions generally are present when fraud 
occurs. First, management or other employees have 
an incentive or are under pressure, which provides a 
reason to commit fraud. Second, circumstances 
exist—for example, the absence of controls, 
ineffective controls, or the ability of management to 
override controls—that provide an opportunity for a 
fraud to be perpetrated. Third, those involved are able 
to rationalize committing a fraudulent act. Some 
individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of 
ethical values that allow them to knowingly and 
intentionally commit a dishonest act. However, even 
otherwise honest individuals can commit fraud in an 
environment that imposes sufficient pressure on 
them. The greater the incentive or pressure, the more 
likely an individual will be able to rationalize the 
acceptability of committing fraud” (AU316.06, 
Paragraph .07). The standard required the audit team 
members to discuss the susceptibility of the entity’s 
financial statements to material misstatement due to 
fraud, and urged them to consider both internal and 
external factors affecting the entity that might create 
pressures for management and others to commit 
fraud, provide the opportunity for fraud to be 
committed, and indicate an environment that enables 
management to rationalize committing fraud 
(AU316.13, Paragraph 15).  
 
In addition, in 2009, the International Auditing 
Standards Board issued a revised version of 
International Standard on Auditing 240 (ISA 240): 
The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in 
an Audit of Financial Statements which stated that 
“Fraud, whether fraudulent financial reporting or 
misappropriation of assets, involves incentive or 
pressure to commit fraud, a perceived opportunity to 
do so and some rationalization of the act” (Ref: Para. 
3).  The standard also provided examples for the three 
fraud risk factors.  For example, Incentive or pressure 
to commit fraudulent financial reporting may exist 
when management is under pressure, from sources 
outside or inside the entity, to achieve an expected 
(and perhaps unrealistic) earnings target or financial 
outcome.  A perceived opportunity to commit fraud 
may exist when the trust violator is in a position of 
trust or has knowledge of specific deficiencies in 
internal control.  The standard also mentioned that 
individuals may be able to rationalise committing a 
fraudulent act.  
 
ISA 240 also required audit team members to discuss 
the susceptibility of the entity to fraud and urged 
them to consider external and internal factors 
affecting the entity that may create an incentive or 
pressure for management or others to commit fraud, 
provide the opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated, 
and indicate a culture or environment that enables 
management or others to rationalize committing fraud 
(A11). Although Cressey’s fraud triangle was 
supported by audit regulators, critics (Albrecht et al. 
1984, Wolfe and Hermanson 2004, Kranacher, et al. 
in 2010, Dorminey et al.2010) argued that the model 
alone is an inadequate tool for deterring, preventing, 
and detecting fraud. Albrecht et al (1984) introduced 
the “Fraud Scale Model” as an alternative for the 
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fraud triangle model.  The fraud scale includes 
personal integrity instead of rationalisation and it is 
particularly applicable to financial reporting fraud 
where sources of pressure (e.g. analysts’ forecasts, 
managements’ earnings guidance, a history of sales 
and earnings growth) are more observable. They 
defined personal integrity as “the personal code of 
ethical behaviour each person adopts” (page 18). 
Personal integrity can be an observable through 
observing both a person’s decisions as well as the 
decision making process.  That person’s commitment 
to ethical decision making can be observed and this 
can help in assessing integrity and thus the likelihood 
of an individual committing fraud.  Their research 
was conducted by performing an analysis of 212 
frauds in the early 1980s to determine the motivations 
of the perpetrators of occupational frauds and abuses. 
They also collected demographics and background 
information on the frauds through questionnaires that 
were distributed to 212 internal auditors of 
companies that had experienced frauds and classified 
motivations to commit financial reporting fraud into 
nine different types which are similar to those of 
Cressey’s non-sharable financial problems: living 
beyond their means, an overwhelming desire for 
personal gain, high personal debt, a close association 
with customers, feeling pay was not commensurate 
with responsibility, a wheeler-dealer attitude, strong 
challenge to beat the system, excessive gambling 
habits, and undue family or peer’s pressure.  They 
also examined comprehensive data sources to 
assemble a complete list of pressure, opportunity, and 
integrity variables, resulting in a collection of 82 
possible red flags of occupational fraud and abuse. 
 
In 2004, Wolfe and Hermanson introduced the 
“Fraud Diamond Model” as shown in figure 3 below, 
where they presented another side that extends the 
fraud triangle which is “the fraudster’s capabilities”.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Fraud Diamond 
 
Source: Wolfe, D. T. and Hermanson, D. R. (2004). 
“The fraud diamond: Considering the four elements 
of fraud”, The CPA Journal, December, p.4 
 
Wolfe and Hermanson believed many frauds would 
not have occurred without the right person with the 
right capabilities implementing the details of the 
fraud.  They also suggested four observable traits for 
committing fraud; (1) Authoritative position or 
function within the organization, (2) capacity to 
understand and exploit accounting systems and 
internal control weaknesses, (3) confidence that 
she/he will not be detected or if caught she/he will get 
out of it easily, and (4) capability to deal with the 
stress created within an otherwise good person when 
she commits bad acts. Another model called “MICE” 
was suggested by Kranacher, et al. in 2010 (as cited 
in Dorminey et al., 2010).  In this model they 
suggested that motivation of fraud perpetrators, 
which is one of the sides in the fraud triangle, may be 
more appropriately expanded and identified with the 
acronym: MICE that stands for: Money, ideology, 
coercion, and ego.  Ideological motivators justify the 
means where they can steal money or participate in a 
fraud act to achieve some perceived greater good that 
is consistent with their beliefs (ideology). Coercion 
occurs when individuals may be unwillingly pulled 
into a fraud scheme, but those individuals can turn 
into whistleblowers.  Ego can also be a motive for 
fraud, where sometimes people don’t like to lose their 
reputation or position of power in front of their 
society or families.  This social pressure can be a 
motive to commit fraudulent act just to keep their 
ego.  In addition, Dorminey, et al. (2010) argued that 
the model cannot solve the fraud problem alone 
because two sides of the fraud triangle, pressure and 
rationalization, cannot be easily observed. 
 
In fact, it is important for auditors to consider all 
fraud models to better understand why fraud is 
committed.  Hence, the above models should all be 
regarded as an extension to Cressey’s fraud triangle 
model and should be integrated in one model that 
includes motivation, opportunity, integrity, and 
fraudster’s capabilities as shown in figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4: The New Fraud Triangle Model 
 
CONCLUSION 
The current paper aims at broadening external 
auditors’ knowledge about fraud and why it occurs.  
It explains Cressey’s fraud triangle model and shows 
its significance, presents the other fraud models and 
relates it to Cressey’s model, and proposes a new 
fraud triangle model that external auditors should 
consider when assessing the risk of fraud.  A 
thorough literature review was undertaken to achieve 
the paper’s aim.  The secondary data used in this 
paper was obtained from different databases like 
Ebscohost, Business Search Premier, Academic 
Search Premier, Emerlad, Sciencedirect, and Jstor. 
Incentive 
Rationalization 
Opportunity 
Capability 
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Reviewing the literature showed that researchers 
classified the motive side of the fraud triangle 
differently. Some researchers classified them as 
personal, employment, or external pressure, while 
others classified them as financial and non-financial 
pressures.  However, it can be noticed that both 
classifications are some-how related. For instance, 
personal pressure can come from both financial and 
non-financial pressure.  A personal financial pressure 
in this case could be gambling addiction or a sudden 
financial need, while a personal non-financial 
pressure can be lack of personal discipline or greed.  
By the same token, employment pressure and 
external pressure can come from either financial or 
non-financial pressure.  Thus, external auditors have 
to keep in mind that pressure/motive to commit fraud 
can be either a personal pressure, employment 
pressure, or external pressure, and each of these types 
of pressures can also happen because of a financial 
pressure or a non financial pressure.  They also need 
to understand the opportunity for fraud to help them 
in identifying which fraud schemes an individual can 
commit and how fraud risks occur when there is an 
ineffective or missing internal control.  
 
Although Cressey’s fraud triangle was supported and 
used by audit regulators (ASB and IAASB), critics 
argued that the model alone is an inadequate tool for 
deterring, preventing, and detecting fraud.  This is 
because two sides of the fraud triangle (pressure and 
rationalization) cannot be observed, and some 
important factors, like fraudsters’ capabilities are 
ignored.  Thus, some researchers suggested the 
rationalization side should be replaced by personal 
integrity because it can be more observable, others 
suggested the motive side needs to be expanded to 
include non-financial factors like ego and coercion, 
while others suggested a fourth side to be added to 
the fraud triangle which is “fraudster’s personal 
capabilities”.  The current paper believes it is 
important for external auditors to consider all the 
fraud models to better understand why fraud occurs.  
The paper also suggests that all other fraud models 
should be regarded as an extension to Cressey’s fraud 
triangle model and should be integrated in one model 
that includes motivation, opportunity, integrity, and 
fraudster’s capabilities.  This model should be called 
“the New Fraud Triangle Model”.  Hence, with the 
new fraud triangle model, external auditors will 
consider all the necessary factors contributing to the 
occurrence of fraud. This should help them in 
effectively assessing fraud risk. 
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